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also provides an analysis on recent suggestions by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, as these are very important for gauging the future role of sovereign ratings for
foreign debt finance in developing countries. While the explanatory power of conventional
rating determinants has declined since the Asian crisis, recent rating performance for Argentina
and Turkey can still be qualified as lagging the markets, as variables of financial-sector strength
and the endogenous effects of capital flows on macroeconomic variables seem to remain
underemphasized in rating assessments. The market impact of sovereign ratings is predicted to
decline as agencies have started to modify their country ceiling policy and as market
participants try to exploit bond trading opportunities arising from the lagged nature of ratings.
The paper presents theory and evidence to suggest that the Basel II Accord will destabilise
private capital flows to the developing countries, if the current proposal to link regulatory bank
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whose risk weights are in turn determined by market-lagging cyclically determined ratings will
reinforce the tendency of the capital ratio to work in a pro-cyclical way.
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1 Introduction
As for foreign finance, the single most important visitor to a developing country was the
representative from a western aid agency in the 1960s; the commercial banker eager to
recycle OPEC surpluses in the 1970s; the IMF official in the 1980s, the ‘lost decade’.
Since then, it has been the sovereign analyst from one of the leading rating agencies,
Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s or Fitch.
The rise in private capital flows, and the stagnation of concessional financial assistance,
has significantly raised the influence of credit ratings on the terms (and magnitude) at
which developing countries can tap world bond markets. Since the bond markets are
effectively unregulated, credit rating agencies have become the markets’ de facto
regulators. Indeed, unlike for industrial countries for which capital market access is
usually taken for granted, sovereign ratings play a critical role for developing countries
as their access to capital markets is precarious and variable. The recent suggestions from
the Committee on Banking Supervision for a new Basel Capital Accord may imply an
even greater regulatory importance of credit ratings in future decades (Reisen 2000 and
Reisen 2001).
The increased importance of rating agencies for emerging-market finance has brought
their work to the attention of a wider group of observers – and under criticism. The
Mexican crisis of 1994–95 brought out that credit rating agencies, like almost anybody
else, were reacting to events rather than anticipating them, an observation reinforced by
rating performance before and during the Asian crisis (Reisen and von Maltzan 1999).
Rating agencies were accused (e.g. by the IMF 1999) and they even acknowledged
themselves (Huhne 1998) of having been guided by outdated rating models, in
particular by ignoring liquidity risks and currency crisis vulnerabilities.
This paper will assess whether the importance of ratings for developing-country finance
has changed and whether rating agencies have modified the determinants for their rating
decisions. It will also provide an analysis on recent suggestions by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, as these are very important for gauging the future role of
sovereign ratings for foreign debt finance in developing countries. Section 2 looks at
rating determinants before and after the Asian crisis, to see what has changed and
whether rating models have moved towards identifying factors stressed by the literature
on crisis vulnerability. Section 3 discusses the market impact of rating events and again
looks at changes since the Asian crisis broke. Section 4 evaluates whether recent
regulatory endeavours to strengthen the role of sovereign ratings in setting banks’
capital requirements is justified in light of their role in boom/bust cycles in developing-
country lending. Section 5 will conclude.
2 Sovereign rating determinants: What has changed?
One of the striking features of the Asian crisis was the so-called rating crisis (Jüttner
and McCarthy 2000), with large rating downgrades of the affected countries – only once
the financial crisis had broken. Korea’s rating, for example, fell on average by three
letter grades and nine rating notches; sovereign rating changes of that magnitude had
never been observed before, and they were rarely observed in the long history of rating
transitions for US corporate bonds (Bonte et al. 1999). The rating instability reflected
more than changes in a country’s underlying fundamentals; it reflected an instability of
the determinants underlying sovereign ratings for emerging markets.2
Sovereign risk reflects the ability and willingness of a government issuer to meet its
future debt obligations. In the absence of a binding international bankruptcy legislation,
creditors have only limited legal redress against sovereign borrowers, which may also
default for political reasons. Both qualitative and quantitative factors are examined to
form a view of overall creditworthiness. Measures of economic and financial
performance are used in the quantitative assessment while political developments,
especially those which bear on fiscal flexibility, form the core of the qualitative
evaluation. While the rating agencies periodically update the list of the numerous
economic, social and political factors that underlie their sovereign credit ratings, part of
them are not quantifiable and there is little guidance as to their relative weights.
The locus classicus for quantitative evidence on sovereign rating determinants is Cantor
and Packer (1996). Using cross sectional data for 49 countries, the authors estimate
which quantitative indicators are weighed most heavily in the determination of
(September 1995) sovereign risk ratings by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and their
average ratings. Per capita income (+), GDP growth (+), consumer price inflation (-),
foreign debt as per cent of exports (-), dummy for economic development (+), dummy
for default history (-) are generally significant with the expected sign, while fiscal
balance (+) and external balance (+) do not enter significantly the authors’ multiple
regression estimates. The adjusted R² is above .90 for average ratings as well as
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings. The results confirm that sovereign ratings
have been to a large extent explained by a limited number of key macroeconomic
variables before the Asian crisis.
Moreover, some of the rating determinants identified above, such as GDP growth and
fiscal balances, are to a certain degree endogenous to capital inflows. To ignore the
endogeneity of such rating determinants risks to introduce a pro-cyclical element into
the rating process and to intensify boom-bust cycles in emerging-market lending, by
underpinning the build-up of unsustainable inflows with improved sovereign ratings.
Note further, that there seems little concern for the allocation of flows: The debt-cycle
hypothesis would require that inflows are invested in trade-related areas and that
marginal savings rates exceed the average savings rate upon receipt of capital inflows
(Ffrench-Davis and Reisen 1998).
The pre-crisis rating determinants identified by Cantor and Packer have little in
common with the domestic roots of financial crises (banking, currency and debt) in
developing countries during the 1990s (see, e.g. Reisen 1998, Goldstein 1999): weak
national banking and financial systems, along with premature and poorly supervised
financial liberalization; poor public and private debt management, with inadequate
liquidity defences against shocks; and vulnerable exchange rate regimes. In other words,
sovereign ratings leading up to the Asian crisis seem to have been driven by an outdated
rating model.3
Table 1
Explanatory Power of Conventional Determinants of Sovereign Ratings
(Adj. R
2 of Cantor-Packer Model)
Average Rating Moody’s Rating S&P’s Rating
1995 0.924 0.905 0.926
1996 0.902 0.884 0.902
1997 0.913 0.909 0.893
1998 0.856 0.863 0.834
Source Cantor and Packer (1996), Jüttner and McCarthy (2000).
Table 1 shows that the explanatory power of the Cantor-Packer model has deteriorated,
in particular in 1998 – one year after the Asian crisis broke – with the adjusted R²
dropping from over 0.90 to 0.86 for Moody’s and 0.83 for Standard & Poor’s. The
model deteriorates during 1997 due to a structural break (Jüttner and McCarthy 2000),
but the addition of new rating determinants help improve the explanatory power. In
addition to the determinants used in the Cantor-Packer model, Jüttner and McCarthy
add five rating determinants stressed in the literature on crisis vulnerability to the eight
determinants identified by Cantor and Packer:
i. short-term interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the US as a proxy of currency risk;
ii. range (1–5) of problematic assets as a per cent of GDP (Standard & Poor’s
assessment of banks);
iii. estimated contingent liability of the financial sector as per cent of GDP;
iv. rolling 4 year growth rate of credit to the private sector as per cent of GDP; and
v. percentage deviation of the real exchange rate from the 1990s averages.
For emerging markets, Jüttner and McCarthy use a process of variables-selection to
identify which out of the total twelve variables yield the highest explanatory power for
sovereign ratings. Mid-1998, consumer price inflation (-), external debt as per cent of
exports (-), dummy default history (-), and only two of the new variables, the interest
rate differential and the real exchange rate, enter significantly in the regression as rating
determinants, with an adjusted R² of 91.2 per cent. Neither the interest rate differential
nor the exchange rate variable were significant determinants of the ratings in mid-1997,
indicating that these variables were overlooked by the agencies before the crisis. Note
also that the financial-sector variables were not reflected in rating differentials, neither
1997 or one year later. This indicates that differences in the strength/fragility of
financial sectors between emerging markets were still not emphasized in rating
decisions one year after the Thai baht plunged. Jüttner and McCarthy conclude that
there is ‘no set model or framework for judgement which are capable of explaining the
variations in the assignment of sovereign ratings over time’ (p.22).4
The impression that, despite lessons specific to the Asian crisis, variables of financial-
sector strength do not seem to play an overriding role in the determinants of sovereign
ratings, seems supported by rating developments in Latin America over the last two
years. While Mexico, generally held to suffer from a weak domestic banking sector,
moved up to investment-grade rating level (Moody’s), Argentina – often praised for the
strength of its domestic financial sector – nevertheless suffered several downgrades in
recent years. The agencies justified these divergent rating trends by emphasizing rather
conventional indicators such as fiscal flexibility and external solvency (Grandes 2001).
Moody’s (2001a) has recently released the first edition of its Country Credit Statistical
Handbook, with a list of ‘quantitative measures’ that flow into its sovereign rating
decisions. The agency acknowledges that
The relevance of specific economic and financial variables can vary
according to the broad level of development of countries. … For
example, more detail on fiscal policy indicators is provided for the
more advanced countries, while a larger range of indicators in the
external debt and balance-of-payments areas is provided for the
developing (emerging market) countries (p.3).
The quantitative indicators fall into four broad categories:
· Economic Structure and Performance, with various measures of GDP (growth),
inflation, unemployment and trade. Moody’s emphasises among these GDP growth
(+) and export growth (+) in the handbook.
· Fiscal Indicators, with general government revenue, expenditure, financial balance,
primary balance and debt as a percentage of GDP. Moody’s stresses
The fiscal balances and debt stocks of the various levels of
government are among the most important indicators examined by
sovereign risk analysts. The ability of government to extract revenues
from the population of taxpayers and users of services, the elasticity of
revenue with respect to the growth or decline of national income, and
the rigidity of the composition of government expenditures are key
factors that determine whether central and local governments will be
able to make full and timely payments of interest and principal on
outstanding debt (p.6).
· External Payments and Debt, where Moody’s provides measures for the real
effective exchange rate (per cent change), relative unit labour costs (per cent
change), current account balance (US$ and per cent of GDP), foreign currency debt
(US$, per cent of GDP, and per cent of exports), and the debt service ratio (as per
cent of exports). Here it is noteworthy that Moody’s states that
Historically, foreign currency debt has been the central indicator of
sovereign risk analysis …but that …is not a meaningful category in
developed countries with low inflation, high monetary credibility, and
deep capital markets and/or universal banks that allow governments
and corporations to borrow long term at fixed rates in domestic
currencies … an additional factor is ‘dollarization’ or ‘euroization’. In5
countries that are effectively operating without a domestic currency,
the borderline between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ debt becomes quite
fuzzy (p.8).
· Monetary and Liquidity Indicators, including short-term interest rates (per cent),
domestic credit (per cent change), domestic credit/GDP, M2/foreign exchange
reserves, foreign exchange reserves (US$), short-term external debt and currently
maturing long-term external debt/foreign exchange reserves, and a liquidity ratio
(external liabilities of banks/external assets of banks. Moody’s still seems a bit
lukewarm on the importance of these indicators as it presents these as ‘of use in
evaluating a country’s vulnerability to a currency or banking crisis’ (p.9). The
agency refers to econometric models as ‘only partially successful, with the best of
the models being able to account for only some of the actual crises that occurred and
predicting too many that did not’ (p.10).
It is fair to argue that the set of indicators emphasized by Moody’s prepares them better
to warn ahead of first-generation currency crises (where domestic macro fundamentals
trigger a financial crisis) than ahead of second-generation (where inconsistencies
between external and internal imbalances matter) or of third-generation crises, where
illiquidity and financial-sector weaknesses play a central role. Standard & Poor’s (e.g.
2001) seems to put more weight on liquidity and financial-sector variables in their
assessments; they explicitly list the importance of banks as contingent liabilities of the
sovereign in their ratings methodology profile. The difference in emphasis observed
here – which can only be casual – suggests that Moody’s has a comparative advantage
in detecting crisis vulnerability in Argentina, while Standard & Poor’s was better
prepared to warn about Turkey’s problems. This impression is supported by the recent
crises in Turkey and Argentina (see Figures 1 and 2).































































































































































In February 2001, another exchange rate based stabilization scheme failed in Turkey
when the lira plunged by more than 30 per cent. A weak banking system, in acute crisis
at the latest since late November 2000, and an over-reliance on hot money inflows had
made the country vulnerable to a financial crisis (OECD 2001). The crisis was a variety
of the now-classic tablita failure experienced famously in the Southern Cone of Latin
America twenty years earlier. As seen in Figure 1, Moody’s downgrade came, once
again, after the crash while Standard & Poor’s downgrade came only slightly earlier.
At least since early 2000, Argentina's currency board failed to deliver sustained
reductions in devaluation and sovereign risk. This was rooted in three major causes
(Braga, Cohen and Reisen 2001). First, the currency board had ceased to confer
sufficient fiscal discipline from 1995 on. This has set in motion a vicious circle of rising
country risk and depressed growth, in turn fuelling the public deficit through lower tax
receipts and higher debt service cost. Second, initial inflation inertia, wage rigidity and
an inappropriate anchor currency have implied real effective overvaluation of the peso.
Business cycles in the US (to which just 8 per cent of Argentine exports are directed)
and Argentina have been asynchron for much of the 1990s, while Brazil’s devaluation
early 1999 strongly weakened Argentina’s competitiveness. Third, high liquidity
requirements were imposed on the country's financial system (to make up for the lack of
the lender-of-last resort function in a currency board). Just like any reserve requirement,
high liquidity needs drive an important wedge between lending rates and saving rates,
discouraging both savings and investment. This again, by constraining growth and
fuelling the need for foreign savings, led to a gradual deterioration of Argentina’s debt
dynamics. Again, rating agencies were fairly late to warn ahead of deteriorating
fundamentals, but they had arguably a better performance as in Turkey in downgrading
ahead of the Argentinean bond crash (the peso remained fixed), the better part of which
occurred in 2001 (see Figure 2).7
3 The market impact of sovereign ratings
Why is it important, in the context of the global financial architecture, to explore the
market impact of sovereign rating events? Answer: because ratings may have an impact
on boom-bust cycles in lending to developing countries. In principle, sovereign ratings
might be able to help attenuate boom-bust cycles in emerging-market lending. During
the boom, early rating downgrades would help dampen euphoric expectations and
reduce private short-term capital flows which have repeatedly been seen to fuel credit
booms and financial vulnerability in the capital-importing countries. By contrast, if
sovereign ratings had no market impact, they would be unable to smoothen boom-bust
cycles. Worse, if sovereign ratings lag rather than lead financial markets but have a
market impact, improving ratings would reinforce euphoric expectations and stimulate
excessive capital inflows during the boom; during the bust, downgrading might add to
panic among investors, driving money out of the country and sovereign yield spreads
up. For example, the downgrading of Asian sovereign ratings to ‘junk status’ reinforced
the region’s crisis in many ways: commercial banks could no longer issue international
letters of credit for local exporters and importers; institutional investors had to offload
Asian assets as they were required to maintain portfolios only in investment-grade
securities; foreign creditors were entitled to call in loans upon the downgrades.
If guided by outdated crisis models, sovereign ratings would fail to provide early
warning signals ahead of a currency crisis, which again might reinforce herd behaviour
by investors. However, as far as sovereign ratings are concerned, there are several
reasons why a significant market impact cannot be easily established. First, sovereign-
risk ratings are primarily based on publicly available information (Larraín et al. 1997),
such as levels of foreign debt and foreign exchange reserves or political and fiscal
constraints. Consequently, any sovereign-rating announcement will be ‘contaminated’
with other publicly available news. Rating announcements may be largely anticipated
by the market. This does not exclude, however, that the interpretation of such news by
the rating agencies will be considered as an important signal of creditworthiness.
Second, in the absence of a credible supranational mechanism to sanction sovereign
default, the default risk premium – unlike in national lending relationships – is
determinated by the borrower’s willingness, rather than his ability, to pay (Eaton et al.
1986). Again, it is not easy for the rating agencies to acquire an information privilege in
this area that could be conveyed to the market through ratings.
By examining the links between sovereign credit ratings and dollar bond yield spreads,
Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) aimed at broad empirical content for judging whether
the three leading rating agencies – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA – can
intensify or attenuate boom-bust cycles in emerging-market lending. The observation
period was from 1989, when emerging market ratings started to gain momentum, to
1997, the year when the Asian crisis broke. The authors produce an event study
exploring the market response (changes in dollar bond yield spreads) for 30 trading days
before and after rating announcements; three results emerged from the event study that
deserve to be emphasized:
· While generally rating ‘events’ from each of the three leading rating agencies do not
produce a statistically significant response in sovereign yield spreads, the
aggregated rating announcements of the three agencies can produce significant
effects on yield spreads in the expected direction, notably on emerging-market
bonds.8
· Implemented rating downgrades increase yield spreads on emerging-market bonds.
While the rise in yield spreads precedes the downgrades, it is sustained for another
twenty trading days after the rating ‘event’.
· Imminent rating upgrades of emerging-market bonds are preceded by significant
yield convergence. Subsequent to the rating ‘event’, however, there is no significant
market response.
However, both rating ‘events’ and yield spreads may be jointly determined by
exogenous shocks; this calls for analysis which corrects yield determinants for
fundamental factors.
Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) therefore ran a Granger causality test, by correcting for
joint determinants of ratings and yield spreads, to find that changes in sovereign ratings
are mutually interdependent with changes in bond yields. The Granger test suggests that
sovereign ratings by the three leading agencies do not independently lead the market,
but that they are interdependent with bond yield spreads once ratings and spreads are
corrected for ‘fundamental’ determinants. While the results suggest that rating
announcements are considered as a significant signal of creditworthiness, their impact
may be due to prudential regulation and internal guidelines of institutional investors
which debar them from holding securities below certain rating categories.1
The two-way causality between ratings and spreads observed over the past decade may
also suggest that the criticism advanced against the agencies in the wake of the Mexican
and the Asian currency crises still holds truth when it is based on more observations
than just those surrounding these prominent crisis episodes. While the event study
suggests that rating agencies do seem to have the potential to moderate booms that
precede currency crises, the Granger tests may justify the concern that this potential has
not yet been productively exploited by the agencies through independently leading the
markets with timely rating changes. As seen in the latest crisis cases Argentina and
Turkey and as confirmed by more recent studies that stretch the observation period
beyond 1997 to the year 2000 (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2001), rating agencies can still
be seen as late rather than early warning systems.
But are they ‘guilty beyond reasonable doubt’? No, according to a recent paper by Mora
(2001). Her findings confirm that ratings move in a procyclical way, but finds the causal
effect from sovereign ratings to both higher cost of borrowing and to capital-flow
reversals remain ambiguous to discern, after controlling for macroeconomic variables
and lagged spreads (a variable which stands for the passive response of sovereign
ratings to changes in market sentiment). But note, instead, that Mora (2001) has another
1 In particular, upgrades to investment grade open up a much wider investor base to emerging and
developing countries. As they become eligible for inclusion in benchmark investment-grade indices,
portfolio managers would have to conciously justify a country’s exclusion rather than start from the
presumption that the country will not be included in investment-grade portfolios. Such portfolios are
particularly held by long-term contractual institutions, such as pension funds and insurance
companies. An upgrade to investment grade will therefore result in higher and more stable demand for
a developing-country bond, as the demand for country’s bonds will not be limited to unconstrained
investors, such as high-yield managers and hedge funds, that are able to trade opportunistically in and
out of speculative-grade bonds.9
puzzling finding: higher rating levels mean a higher probability of currency crashes
once other factors are controlled for. The finding is explained by the amount of capital
flows that countries with better ratings could obtain and which made them more
vulnerable to capital-flow reversals.
What about the future market impact of sovereign ratings? In a very recent revision to
its country ceiling policy, Moody’s (2001b) announced that it will allow certain
borrowers to ‘pierce’ the country ceiling, i.e. to obtain better ratings than foreign-
currency bonds of the government in their respective domiciliation. The traditional
rationale for country ceilings has been that governments confronted by an external
payments crisis had the power and motivation to limit foreign currency outflows,
including debt payments. As sovereign ratings serve as a ceiling for private-sector
ratings of any given country, their influence stretches far beyond government securities.
Several months earlier, Standard & Poor’s (2000) had announced enhanced ratings for
private-sector issuers from subinvestment-grade countries if transfer and convertibility
insurance was utilized.
Pointing to recent experience with defaults on government debt – notably Ecuador,
Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine – Moody’s feels that ‘large, internationally recognized
entities that have relied significantly on access to international capital markets and
whose default would inflict substantial damage on the economy’ (p.1) are allowed to go
on to service foreign currency debt. Consequently, the agency placed in June 2001 38
energy companies, financial institutions and telecommunications companies from
emerging markets, many from Brazil and Mexico, on review for upgrade. The change in
the country ceiling approach should not only allow the ratings of private-sector debtors
to exceed their country ceilings, but it should also diminish the market impact of
sovereign rating events as less borrowers will be immediately concerned by them.
Indicators of credit rating pressure as instruments for trading emerging-market bonds,
such as developed by Deutsche Bank (2000), may increase anticipation and hence
decrease the measured market impact of rating events. Rating actions are delivered in
discrete, and as documented above, late fashion while credit fundamentals move
continuously. Yet rating events excert an impact on spreads. This can be exploited by
bond traders. Referring to Larrain, Reisen and von Maltzan (1997) and Reisen and von
Maltzan (1999), Deutsche Bank has built a regression model to explain credit ratings
and calibrates twelve months forecasts to arrive at a current fitted rating. Rating
pressure is then defined as the difference between the fitted and the actual rating for a
given country. Long and short positions can then be engaged according to whether the
rating pressure indicator is positive or negative. When the rating action finally hits the
market, these investment bets can be dissolved (‘sell the news’), which may trigger
perverse measured market responses to rating changes. As Deutsche Bank (2000)
declares to have profitably used indicators of rating pressure for their trading strategies,
other investors may have started to play rating events in the same way.
4 Revisions to the Basel accord and sovereign ratings
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has released two consultative papers on
the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee 1999, 2001), which sets a standard for
regulatory bank capital provision; both intend to grant rating agencies an explicit role in10
the determination of risk weights applied to minimum capital charges against different
categories of borrowers. Risk weights determine the banks’ loan supply and funding
costs, as banks have to acquire a corresponding amount of capital relative to their risk-
weighted assets.
It is widely agreed that cross-border lending has faced regulatory distortions through the
1988 Basel Accord. Most importantly, short-term bank lending to the emerging markets
has been encouraged by a relatively low 20 per cent risk weight, while bank credit to
non-OECD banks with a residual maturity of over one year has been discouraged by a
100 per cent risk weight. This has stimulated cross-border interbank lending, which has
been described as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the international financial system. And, OECD-
based banks and governments have received a more lenient treatment, even if they
constitute sovereign risks equivalent or inferior to non-OECD emerging markets.
Hence, a reform of the Basel Accord should be welcome.
While the proposed revisions to the Basel Accord on capital adequacy will maintain the
8 per cent risk-weighted capital requirement, the Committee initially proposed revisions
to the calculation of risk weightings which would substitute credit ratings for a split
between OECD and non-OECD as the main determinant (Reisen 2000). The Committee
is now proposing two main approaches to the calculation of risk weights: a
‘standardized’ and an ‘internal ratings-based’ (IRB) approach (Griffith-Jones and Spratt
2001, Reisen 2001). One of the main changes from the Committee’s 1999 Consultative
Paper (Basel Committee 1999) is the clear intention that leading banks will be able to
use the IRB approach to set risk weights. The major change compared to the 1988 Basel
Accord is that for sovereign exposures, membership in the OECD will no longer
provide the benchmark for risk weights.
Table 2
The new Basel capital accord:
Risk weight under the standardized approach, %
Agency rating AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to B- Below B-
Sovgn. ECA risk
score
12 3 4 - 6 4 - 6 7
Sovereigns 0 20 50 100 100 150
Banks—option 1






Corporates 20 50 100 100 150 150
Source Basel committee on banking supervision, ‘The new Basel capital accord: an explanatory note’,
second consultative paper, Basel, January 2001 (www.bis.org)
(1) Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated. The rating
shown thus refers to the sovereign rating.
(2) Risk weighting based on the rating of the individual bank.
(3) Claims on banks with an original maturity of less than 3 months would receive a weighting one
category more favourable than the risk weighting shown above subject to a floor of 20 per cent.11
Table 2 summarises the proposals for risk weights under the standardized approach. The
proposed risk weights will substitute credit ratings by ‘eligible external credit
assessment institutions’, not just rating agencies as under the 1999 proposal but also
export credit agencies (ECA),2 for a split between OECD and non-OECD as the main
determinant. Risk weights will continue to be determined by the category of the
borrower – sovereign, bank or corporate – but within each of these categories, changes
have been made. Under the proposal, a sovereign with a AAA rating (or 1 ECA risk
score under the OECD 1999 methodology) would receive a 0 per cent risk weight;
lower ratings translate into a jump in risk weights via 20, 50, 100 to 150 per cent for
sovereigns weighted below B- (or ECA risk score 7). For the treatment of claims on
banks, there are two options. The first option requires that banks be assigned a risk
weight that is one category less favourable than that assigned to the sovereign of
incorporation. National supervisors in low-rated developing countries may opt for the
second option, which bases the risk weight on the external assessment of the bank. For
claims on corporates, a more risk-sensitive framework is now proposed by moving
away from the uniform 100 per cent risk weight for all corporate credits under the 1988
Accord.
Both theory and evidence suggest that the Basel II Accord will destabilise private
capital flows to the developing countries, if the current proposal to link regulatory bank
capital to sovereign ratings is maintained. This hypothesis contains two elements: First,
theory suggests that linking bank lending to regulatory capital through a rigid minimum
capital ratio acts to amplify macroeconomic fluctuations. Second, evidence summarized
in the preceding section suggests that sovereign ratings lag rather than lead the markets;
it seems that there is little scope to improve on that performance. Thus, assigning fixed
minimum capital to bank assets whose risk weights are in turn determined by market-
lagging ratings will reinforce the tendency of the capital ratio to work in a pro-cyclical
way. The Basel II proposals reinforce that tendency further as a strong discontinuity in
treating A and below-rated assets will make banks’ loan portfolio more liquidity-
hungry, hence raising the vulnerability of the financial system to liquidity risk.
The theory: Assuming a non-Modigliani-Miller world where investment demand
depends on the ability of firms to retain earnings or to obtain bank loans, Blum and
Hellwig (1995) show how capital adequacy regulation for banks may reinforce
macroeconomic fluctuations. If negative shocks to aggregate demand reduce the ability
of debtors to service their debts to banks, such reduction in debt service lowers bank
equity which in turn reduces bank lending and investment because of capital adequacy
requirements. Linking bank lending to bank equity thus acts as an automatic amplifier
for macroeconomic fluctuations: banks lend more when times are good, and less when
times are bad. Moreover, the minimum capital ratio can also be shown to raise the
sensitivity of investment demand to changes in output and prices.
An important assumption that underlies the Blum-Hellwig model is that the capital
adequacy requirement is binding. With a binding requirement c, an additional dollar of
bank profits induces 1/c additional units of bank lending. As the bank minimum ratios
have been hovering pretty much around the required 8 per cent in the major advanced
countries, they can generally be considered as binding; the logic of the Blum-Hellwig
model is thus of more than purely academic interest.
2 See Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001) for a discussion on the use of export credit agencies in regulating
bank capital and the potential impact on developing countries.12
It can be argued that the specific proposal for the Basel II Accord risks reinforcing the
pro-cyclical impact of minimum capital requirements. A large discontinuity is suggested
in Basel II between risk weights on A and below-rated borrowers. To the extent that a
high share of banks’ loan portfolio is invested in A-borrowers, the financial system may
become vulnerable to a liquidity crisis in a downturn when borrowers become
downgraded. This would face banks with higher capital requirements to the same class
of borrowers. One dimension of bank response will be to cut back lending to lower rated
credits.
Linking regulatory bank capital to agency ratings might move the banks’ loan portfolio
behaviour closer to their short-term trading pattern. Governed by the mark-to-market
rules of the Value at Risk (VAR) approach, banks’ trading books have been shown to
have first encouraged excessive bank lending and then intensified the global contagion
of the 1998 financial crisis (Reisen 1999). Crisis contagion under VAR is intensified as
a volatility event in one country automatically generates an upward re-estimate of credit
and market risk in a correlated country. The Basel II proposals reinforce pro-cyclical
tendencies further as a strong discontinuity between risk weights on differently rated
assets will make banks’ loan portfolio more liquidity-hungry, hence raising the
vulnerability of the financial system to liquidity risk. To the extent that a high share of
banks’ loan portfolio is invested in triple-B rated sovereign and corporates (with a 50
per cent risk weight, recall Table 2), downgrades on such assets (implying a 100 per
cent risk weight according to the ‘standardized’ approach) will force banks to reserve
more liquidity or to cut back lending to the downgraded borrowers. The financial
system would become more vulnerable to a liquidity crisis.
The evidence: The determinants and nature of sovereign ratings risk to intensify the pro-
cyclical impact of capital adequacy requirements under the Basel II proposals. First, the
real rate of (annual) GDP growth has repeatedly been identified as an important
determinant for ratings, with a positive sign (see section 2). This implies that during
boom periods sovereign ratings will improve, while they decline during bust periods,
hence reinforcing boom-bust cycles. Second, as it is hard for the agencies to acquire an
information edge on sovereign risk, they tend to lag rather than lead financial markets
(Reisen and von Maltzan 1999); and their ratings on lowly-rated borrowers are
characterized at times by a low degree of durability (IMF 1999), indicating a weak
prediction value. The Basel II Accord would strengthen the market impact of sovereign
ratings. However, as long as sovereign ratings fail to convey privileged information to
the markets, improving ratings would reinforce euphoric expectations and stimulate
excessive capital inflows to the emerging markets; during the bust, downgrading might
add to panic among creditors and investors, driving money out of the affected countries
and sovereign yield spreads up.
Moreover, the New Basel Accord still discourages long-term interbank lending to
emerging and developing countries. For speculative-grade developing countries, the
regulatory incentives for short-term interbank lending thus tilt the structure of their
capital imports towards short-term debt. Short-term foreign debt, in relation to official
foreign exchange reserves, has been identified as the single most important precursor of
financial crises triggered by capital-flow reversals.13
Table 3
Regulatory incentives for short-term interbank lending
















































































































































































































10 20 1.6 6.3 10 20 1.6 6.3




7 0.6 16.7 -6 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Triple-B (non-OECD)
100 100 8.0 12.5 100 20 1.6 62.5




40 3.2 31.3 -60 10 0.8 125.0 -50
Double-B (non-OECD)
400 100 8.0 50.0 400 20 1.6 250.0




379 30.3 13.2 +1115 60 4.8 83.3 +800
Single-B (non-OECD)
700 100 8.0 87.5 700 20 1.6 437.5




630 50.4 13.9 +3709 400 32.0 21.9 +13300
Source Own calculation based on procedure developed in Deutsche Bank, ‘New Basel capital accord’,
17 January 2001, http://research.gm.db.com
(1) For the IRB approach, long-term (3 years) risk weights are obtained from the cubic regression
estimate given in Figure 1. The underlying default rates for short-term exposures were obtained
from Moody’s; they are 0 per cent for double-A; 0.1 per cent for triple-B; 0.6 per cent for double-
B; and 6.8 per cent for single-B borrowers (Moody’s). For the standardized approach, claims on
banks rated between A+ and BB- with an original maturity of less than 3 months would receive a
rating one category more favourable than the risk weight on longer maturities.
(2) Assumes LIBOR flat funding. Risk-adjusted return on capital is 100/regulatory capital required
per US$100 times spread over LIBOR; quoted as return in excess over LIBOR.
(3) Indicates the amount of spread movement needed (in basis points) to produce the risk-adjusted
return achieved under the current Basel I environment. Breakeven spread change is difference in
risk adjusted return between ‘current’ and ‘standardized’, resp. ‘IRB approach’ times capital
required per US$100 in ‘standardized’, resp. ‘IRB approach’.14
Table 3 displays the potential impact of risk weights for short-term (below 3 months)
bank-to-bank lending. Let us first have a look how the current (1988) Basel Accord has
discouraged long-term bank lending to banks from developing countries, as opposed to
the neutral incentives provided for lending to OECD-based banks. The risk-adjusted
return for lending to triple-B rated non-OECD banks is calculated as 12.5 per cent for
long, but 62.5 per cent for short maturities; the respective numbers are 50 per cent
versus 250 per cent for double-B rated banks, and 87.5 per cent versus 437 per cent for
single-B rated banks. The standardized approach suggested in Basel II attenuates the
bias towards short-term lending to triple-B and double-B rated borrowers, but does not
entirely delete them. By contrast, bank-to-bank lending to single-B rated borrowers
would not any longer be distorted by higher risk-adjusted returns on short-term lending
under the ‘standardized’ approach3.
Strong incentives, by contrast, continue to be provided under the ‘internal ratings-based’
approach for short-term bank lending, in particular to triple-B banks. The required
breakeven spread change is minus 50 basis points on short-term lending under the IRB
approach compared to the current Basel requirements, as the corresponding risk weight
drops to 10 per cent, assuming a 0.1 per cent probability of default on short-term
exposure according to the evidence provided in Moody’s (2001a). Therefore, while for
exposures with a residual maturity of 3 years the corresponding probability of default
(0.41 per cent) translates into a risk weight of 40 per cent and a risk-adjusted return of
31.3 per cent (for an assumed spread over LIBOR of 100 basis points), the equivalent
risk-adjusted return is much higher, 125 per cent, for short-term exposures to triple-B
rated banks.
5 Some policy conclusions
Unlike for industrial countries for which capital market access is usually taken for
granted, sovereign ratings play a critical role for developing countries, as their access to
capital markets is precarious and variable. The recent suggestions from the Committee
on Banking Supervision for a new Basel Capital Accord may imply an even greater
regulatory importance of credit ratings in future decades.
In principle, sovereign ratings might be able to help to attenuate boom-bust cycles in
emerging-market lending. During the boom, early rating downgrades would help to
dampen euphoric expectations and reduce private short-term capital flows which have
repeatedly been seen to fuel credit booms and financial vulnerability in the capital-
importing countries. By contrast, if sovereign ratings had no market impact, they would
be unable to smooth boom–bust cycles. Worse, if sovereign ratings lag rather than
3 Strong incentives, by contrast, continue to be provided under the ‘internal ratings-based’ approach for
short-term bank lending, in particular to triple-B banks (Reisen 2001). The required breakeven spread
change is minus 50 basis points on short-term lending under the IRB approach compared to the
current Basel requirements, as the corresponding risk weight drops to 10 per cent, assuming a 0.1 per
cent probability of default on short-term exposure according to the evidence provided in Moody’s
(2001a). Therefore, while for exposures with a residual maturity of 3 years the corresponding
probability of default (0.41 per cent) translates into a risk weight of 40 per cent and a risk-adjusted
return of 31.3 per cent (for an assumed spread over LIBOR of 100 basis points), the equivalent risk-
adjusted return is much higher, 125 per cent, for short-term exposures to triple-B rated banks.15
lead financial markets, but have a market impact, improving ratings would reinforce
euphoric expectations and stimulate excessive capital inflows during the boom;
during the bust, downgrading might add to panic among investors, driving money
out of the country and sovereign yield spreads up. If guided by outdated crisis
models, sovereign ratings would fail to provide early warning signals ahead of a
currency crisis, which again might reinforce herd behaviour by investors. This paper
has therefore investigated whether rating determinants and market impact have
changed since the Asian Crisis, when the major rating agencies came under heavy
criticism for their failure to warn ahead of the crisis and for their pro-cyclical
downgrades.
Rating behaviour around the most recent emerging-market crises in Argentina and
Turkey suggest that rating determinants have not been sufficiently modified to put
the agencies ahead of market events, although conventional rating determinants
have been shown to have lost some explanatory power. Financial-sector weaknesses
and illiquidity do not yet seem to get the weight in rating actions that they would
deserve. Pro-cyclical rating determinants remain an important ingredient of
agencies’ notes, and it is suggested that agencies correct them for the endogenous
effects of (short-term) capital inflows.
But even with such improvements, sovereign ratings are bound to lag the markets.
First, credit ratings and rating actions are delivered in discrete fashion, with
actions being taken when sufficient upward or downward pressure has built up
upon the credit fundamentals, which in turn move in continuous fashion. Second,
sovereign-risk ratings are primarily based on publicly available information.
Consequently, any sovereign-rating announcement will be ‘contaminated’ with other
publicly available news. Third, rating announcements may be largely anticipated by the
market. (This does not exclude, however, that the interpretation of such news by the
rating agencies will be considered as an important signal of creditworthiness.)
While sovereign ratings have often been seen to lag markets, in particular joint
downgrades of emerging-market debt by the leading agencies have had a lasting market
impact; upgrades, by contrast, seem largely anticipated. The impact of downgrades may
be due to prudential regulation and internal industry guidelines of institutional investors,
which debar them from holding securities below certain rating categories, and debt
contracts that allow creditors to withdraw loans when borrower ratings drop below a
certain threshold. But, unless prudential regulation, i.e. the Basel Accord, reinforces the
market impact of sovereign ratings, their future impact might diminish somewhat. The
agencies have started to loosen their country ceiling policy, allowing certain private-
sector borrowers better ratings than their sovereigns. And emerging-market bond
trading strategies seem to have increasingly exploited the late nature of rating actions by
anticipating them.
Finally, this paper has addressed the concern that the Basel II Accord will destabilise
private capital flows to the developing countries, if the current proposal to link
regulatory bank capital to sovereign ratings is maintained. Assigning fixed minimum
capital to bank assets whose risk weights are in turn determined by market-lagging
ratings will reinforce the tendency of the capital ratio to work in a pro-cyclical way.
Credit spreads will more closely reflect credit ratings as a proxy of default probabilities.
While this is exactly what supervisors are aiming at, the calculations provided here16
indicate that the chasm between investment-grade borrowers, mostly based in OECD
and in some of the more successful emerging markets, and speculative-grade borrowers,
mostly from the developing world, will deepen. This outcome would clearly run against
endeavours of the global development community to broaden the range of developing
countries that benefit from private capital inflows. The Basel II proposals risk not only
to raise capital cost for speculative-grade developing countries, but they may also
increase the volatility of bank credit supply to this group of countries.17
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